The Application Service Hosting Plarform (ASHP) has recently received tremendous attention from both industry and academia. An ASHP provides a shared highpe$omzance infrastructure to host different Applicatiori Services (AS), outsourced by Application Service Providers (ASP). In this paper; we focus on the protection of ASHP, which has inherent requirement of sharing, openness, and mutual isolation. Differerit from a dedicated server platform, which is analogous with a private house, an ASHP is like an apartment building, involving the 'host'the ASHP infrastructure and the 'tenants'the AS. Strong protection and isolation must be provided between the host and the tenants, as well as behveen different tenants.
Introduction
An Application Service Hosting Platform (ASHP) consists of high performance hosts connected by high speed networks. The ASHP creates a shared platform for the host- ing of multiple Application Services (AS), which are outsourced by their respective Application Service Providers (ASP). Examples of AS include e-laboratories, e-campaign, and on-line conference management. In an ASHP, AS are installed and invoked on-demand at the requests of their ASP, and ASHP resources are dynamically allocated to the AS according to thcir service load. Therefore, ASHP reflects the vision of utility computing: computational resources are supplied on-demand, and turned off when no longer needed. ASHP have recently drawn tremendous attention from both industry (eg. IBM, HP, and VERITAS) and academia (eg. Xen [IO] and SHOP [21] ). Current research in ASHP mainly focuses on dynamic resource provisioning. Much fewer efforts have been devoted to the critical problem of ASHP security and protection. In this paper, we show that ASHP protection poses new challenges. The new challenges are due to an ASHP's inherent requirement of openness, sharing and mutual isolatiun. Unlike a dedicated server platform which is analogous with a private house, an ASHP is like an apartment building, involving both the 'host'the ASHP infrastructure and the 'tenants' -the AS. From a tenant's point of view, the ASHP should be a safe place to 'live' with privacy and isolation. From the landlord's point of view, the tenants should not do any damage to the 'properly' and should not bother other tenants. More specifically, we consider the following requirements:
ASHP host protection: The ASHP hosts should be protected from attacks from outside the ASHP. If one ASHP host is attacked, all AS residing in it will be affected.
Confinement of AS:
The ASHP should prevent any damage by its tenantsthe AS. It is desirable that the activities of each AS are strictly confined within their allocated space in the ASHP.
Isolation between AS:
It is equally important that the ASHP should provide isolation between the tenants:
Each AS should run as if it is in a dedicated environ- Unfortunately, the traditional single-level OS architecture, in which one underlying host OS supports all AS running on top of it, is not adequate to meet the above requirements (to be discussed in Section 2). In this paper, we present a new two-level ASHP architecture, based on the virtual OS technology. In the two-level architecture, each AS runs on top of a virtual guest OS; while the guest OS runs on top of the host OS.
Although the virtual OS technology is not new [IO, 13, 231 , we have developed novel mechanisms for ASHP protection. Most notably, we have implemented ( I ) resource isolation (CPU;handwidth, and memory) between AS, (2) virtual switching and firewalling between AS inside the same ASHP host, and (3) Kernon, a kemelized intrusion detection and logging system for each AS. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 compares the single-level and two-level ASHP architectures. Section 3 presents an overview of our two-level ASHP architecture called SODA. Section 4 describes the novel ASHP protection mechanisms in SODA. Section 5 presents performance evaluation results. Section 6 outlines the application of SODA to ishare, an Internet-based resource sharing platform. Section 7 compares our work with related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
Comparison of ASHP Architectures
The two different ASHP architectures are shown in In both architectures, multiple AS are hosted in one ASHP host. In the single-level architecture, all AS run directly on top of the host OS. In the two-level architecture, each AS runs within a virtual server, which is physically a 'slice' of the ASHP host. Inside the virtual server, the AS software runs on top of a virtual guest OS.
We argue that the traditional single-level architecture is not adequate for ASHP protection, in the following aspects:
Administration isolation: It is desirable that each ASP has full administrator privilege only within the corresponding AS, so that the ASP can perform ASspecific management tasks such as datdsoftware upgrade. However, if the administrator privileges of all ASP are at the same (host OS) Icvel, access control will become complicated and may lead to security holes.
Installation isolation: Different AS may require the same library, hut of different versions, or their service daemons may require the same port binding. In the single-level architecture, such conflicts are difficult to resolve and can potentially lead to local DOS attacks (by port exhaustion, for example) between AS. On the other hand, the two-level architecture naturally eliminates such conflicts.
Fault/aftack isolation: If all AS run at the same host OS level, any fault or security breach in one AS will affect the host OS and therefore other AS. For example, ghttpd [ 191 is a light-weight web server run by the root. However, one known attack upon ghrrpd is: a malicious packet is sent as an H T I P request, causing buffer overflow to bind a shell on a certain port. Then the attacker can remotely log in using the port, and run a remote shell! On the other hand, in the two-level architecture, since the root that runs ghttpd is the root of the guesr OS, not the host OS, the attack will not affect the host OS as well as other AS.
Crash recovery andforensics:
In the single-level architecture, to recover from an attacklcrash of an AS, the entire ASHP host will have to be rebooted. As a result, other AS in the same ASHP host will be affected.
On the other hand, in the two-level architecture, the recovery of one AS has no impact on the normal operations of other AS: the ASHP administrator can simply restart the virtual scrver; and the image of the attacked virtual server is dumped to a file and sent to an off-line site for forensic analysis.
In the two-level architecture, due to the 'guest OShost OS' indirection, AS performance slow-down is inevitable. In other words, to achieve the same AS service quality as in the single-level architecture, the two-level architecture requires more CPU capacity. With the rapid advances in processor speed, such cost is getting affordable.
SODA: Our Two-Level ASHP Architecture
We have developed a two-level ASHP architecture called [6], a UML runs directly in the unmodified user space of the host OS; and processes within a UML will he executed in the virtual server exactly the same way as they would he executed in a native Linux machine. A special thread is created to intercept the system calls made by all process threads of the UML, and redirect them into the guest OS kernel. The following features are enabled by leveraging the 'UML (guest 0S)Linux (host OS)' structure:
The host OS has a separate kernel space from the guest OSes (UMLs), therefore preventing any harm done by individual guest OS to the host OS.
An IP address is assigned to each virtual server, so that it has full intemetworking capability just like a physical server.
A virtual server can be frozenhestarted without affecting other virtual servers: the images of both the UML and the AS on top of it can he copied to a file. and be conveniently hacked up and restarted. Such feature enables easy faultlattack recovery and forensic analysis.
However, current Linux (as host OS) and UML (as guest OS) are not sufficient to achieve SODA security. We have extended both of them by implementing a number of protection mechanisms as described in the next section.
ASHP Protection Mechanisms in SODA
In this section, we present three ASHP protection mechanisms in SODA: ( I ) resource isolation, (2) virrualswirching and firewalling, and (3) Kemort, a kemelized inrrusion detection and logging system. All mechanisms aim at meeting the ASHP protection requirements in Section 1.
(1) and (2) are implemented inside the host OS, while (3) is implemented inside the guest OS.
Although far from being a complete suite of SODA security solutions, these mechanisms form the basis on which more complicated security mechanisms and policies can he implemented.
Resource Isolation between Virtual Servers
Resource isolation not only provides performance guarantee to the AS running in each virtual server, but also prevents an ill-behaving or malicious AS from launching local DOS attacks upon other AS in the same ASHP host. Currently, our SODA implementation supports CPU, network bandwidth, and memory isolation. SODA resource isolation mechanism has been presented in [16] . A summary is as follows for the completeness o f this paper.
CPU capacity isolation is achieved by implementing a coarse-grain CPU proportional sharing scheduler in the Linux host OS. The scheduler enforces the CPU share allocated to each virtual server. The CPU share of a virtual server is decided when the corresponding AS is admitted to the SODA platform. Within one virtual server, all processes hear the same user (AS) id. The host OS CPU scheduler then enforces CPU proportional sharing among all processes based on their user ids.
Network bandwidth isolation is similarly achieved by implementing a traffic controller inside the Linux host OS. The traffic controller enforces the outbound bandwidth share allocated to each virtual server. Recall that each virtual server has its own IP address. The traffic controller achieves bandwidth isolation between virtual servers based on the IP addresses of outgoing packets generated by these virtual servers.
Memory isolation: Memory is critical to the performance o f virtual servers (and therefore that of AS). SODA simply leverages the memory usage limit feature of UML: the maximum amount of memory available to a virtual scrver (both AS and guest OS) can he specified as a parameter when UML, the guest OS, is startcd.
Note that resource isolation only prevents DOS attacks between AS. To prevent intra-AS.DoS attacks launched by the clients of an AS, other methods (such as client puzzles [9] ) still need to be installed as part of the AS software.
Virtual Switching and Firewalling
SODA uses virtual switching to connect the virtual servers to the outside world as well as between the virtual servers. More importantly, virtual switching achieves strong protection for the SODA host: the physical SODA host itself will have no IP address. Therefore, the host OS is totally 'invisible' and therefore un-attackable from the Internet.
To realize the seemingly conflicting goals of virtual server networking and SODA host in-visibility, we have implemented a software switch module inside the host OS ( Figure 2 ). This solution is inspired by a real layer-two switch connecting physical NICs, yet the switch itself does not have an IP address. Similarly, we create a software switch in the host OS, connecting multiple virtual NICs of the virtual servers and one physical NIC of the SODA host.
The software switch forwards packets tolfrom the virtual servers. Furthermore, we enhance the software switch to support firewalling between the virtual servers. A physical firewall can protect the SODA host from attacks from the outside, but it cannot handle attacks from one virtual server against another virtual server inside the same SODA host. Fortunately, our software switch provides an ideal venue to perform inter-virtual-server firewalling: The firewall module is plugged in on the packet path between the virtual servers, enforcing access policies ('who can connect to whom') between the virtual servers. Currently, the firewall implementation in SODA is based on the widely adopted nerfilterliptables suite. The software switch can easily accommodate more complicated firewalling rules such as those for reverse firewalls. With virtual switching and firewalling, the AS can communicate and collaborate in a secure fashion, making it possible to create composite and value-added application services. On the other hand, it is also possiblc to enforce communication isolation via the virtual firewallfor example, to prevent two competing AS (which sell the same products, for instance) from attacking each other.
Kernort: Kernelized Intrusion Detection and Logging
Intrusion detection is important to each AS hosted in SODA. It is interesting to determine where to install intrusion detection systems (IDS) in SODA: If an IDS is installed as an application-level system, it can be casily disabled by the intruder once the system is compromised. If an IDS runs inside thc host OS, it will not be able to interpret any encrypted traffic which may be from an intruder-initiated ssh session, because the decryption will take place in the guest OS, not in host OS. As a result, we choose to install Kernort, our IDS system, inside the guest OS of each virtual server, as shown in Figure 3 . To be tamper-free, Kernort is not a loadable kernel module. Instead, it is 'hard wired' as part of the guest OS kernel' compiled by a trusted UML factory (to be described shortly).
Kernort can be regarded as the 'kemelized' and extended version of snort [4] , an open source IDS. Driven by system calls and packet reception, Kernort performs signature based real-time intrusion detection. Since Kemort is located in the data path, one concern is the overhead it adds to the normal virtual server operations. Our measurement results in Section 5 show that for a small set of attack signatures 'To &e the guest OS hrnel un-damageable by in processes. we leverage the 'skas' mode of UML the UML kernel is in a separate address space from it processes. making the UML kernel totally invisible to its praCeSSes. I Kernort also performs logging for each AS, which is necessary for off-line intrusion detection (based on a much larger attack signature set) and auditing. However, logging poses the following dilemma: If it is performed inside the guest OS, the log may be tampered with or even erased by an intruder, who tends to do so first thing after breaking into a virtual server. On the other hand, if logging is performed by the host OS, two problems will arise: (1) the privacy of the tenants (AS) is violated, because the landlord can view the AS log and (2) it is difficult or even impossible to log activities that happen inside the virtual server.
,
In Kernort, we adopt a novel strategy to solve the above problem as shown in Figure 3 : the log data are generated by Kernort in the guest OS kernel, but they are stored in the host file system. Kernort is capable of taking snapshots of AS execution, as well as collecting system-wide (within the virtual server) log data such as those from syslogd and klogd, and verbatim record of user console (local and remote) input. The log data are immediately pushed down to the host file system for storage. Recall that the host OS is un-attackable from both inside and outside, and therefore a much safer place to store the log data.
Furthermore, to conserve the privacy of the AS, Kernort will encrypt the log data before pushing them down to the host OS. For an AS, the key to encrypt the log data is generated and compiled into the UML kernel by a trusted authority called the Trusted UML Factory, before the AS is created in the SODA host. As shown in Figure 4 , the Trusted UML Factory obtains the image of the AS from the ASP, and builds a customized guest OS (UML) kernel with both Kernort and the key compiled in it. The images of thc AS and guest OS will then be downloaded to the SODA host. The key is nowhere to he obtained in the SODA host. Instead, it will he kept by the Trusted UML Factory and by the ASP. In the event of a crash or an attack, the key will be used to decrypt the log data for forensic analysis. 
Experiments and Performance Evaluation
We have deployed a local testbed of SODA to demonstrate and evaluate the protection mechanisms in Section 4. The SODA hosts in the testhed are Dell PowerEdge 2650 servers each with a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon processor and 2GB RAM, connected by lOOMbps LAN. Performance of the resource isolation mechanisms has been presented in [16] .
We first demonstrate Kernort in action: we launch a known attack called Lion Worm against one virtual server running in a SODA host. When the attack occurs, Kernort issues an intrusion alarm in real-time as shown in Figure 5 .
As another demonstration, Figure 6 shows a screenshot that looks very much like a regular session. In fact, it is nor. It is instead a replay of an earlier ssh session, based on the log recorded by Kemort.
To evaluate the overhead added to each virtual server by Kernort, we have performed a number of experiments using LMbench [17] , a suite of benchmarks for UNIX system performance comparison. More specifically, we compare the performance of a virtual server with and without Kernort running in its guest OS. The virtual server runs under otherwise the same configuration in the same SODA host. Kemon contains a set of 10 attack signatures. Tables 1-3 show the comparison results: Table 1 shows Table 2 shows context switching time between different number of processes with different working set sizes; and Table 3 shows the file system and virtual memory system latency. All results clearly indicate that Kernort in the guest OS incurs very low overhead to the virtual server. Finally, to evaluate the networking overhead incurred by Kernort, we performed another set of measurements of TCP throughput and latency. Figures 7 and 8 show the comparison results under different TCP send buffer sizes. The throughput and latency penalty incurred by Kemort is low, as indicated by the results. In summary, all our experimental results show that Kernort is an effective and low-overhead mechanism for ASHP protection.
Application to Share
As our ongoing work, we are integrating SODA into a fully decentralized resource sharing platform called ishare [2]. Designed as an Internet-sharing middleware, Share facilitates the supply and request of shared computing resources, including programs and AS dispersed over the Internet. A key idea of the de-central structure is that resourcelservice providers can post their availability, together with any access rules, on web pages. Share user nodes will then discover these resources and access them, if they agree with the published rules. Share presents the discovered resources to end users in the form of Cybrrlaboratories. For example, the Nanotechnology, Lifesciences, or Parallel Programming Cyherlaboratories include software tools as well as databases that are specific to the respective subjects. Since S h a r e imposes no constraints on publishable resource properties, access protocols, and authentication methods, security becomes a concern for resource providers. It is desirable that the 'slice' of resource contributed by a provider to the community remains highly isolated from the remaining and private part ofthe resource. SODA and its protection mechanisms are expected to bring strong isolation and enhanced security to the ishare platform.
Related Work
Internet hosting has been moving from content hosting to application service (AS) hosting. The latter requires a higher degree of isolation in resource, administration, and [61, D e d i [231, Xen [IO] , UML [131, and UMLinux [12] . They all support the creation of virtual servers based on the guest OShost OS architecture. It is noteworthy that virtual machine and networking technology has also been applied to Grid computing, such as in In- VIGO [SI and Virtuoso [201. The protection and security mechanisms in SODA can be integrated into these systems.
It is noteworthy and interesting that the user-level mechanism for system call interposition in [IS] is very similar to the way the UML [ 131 guest OS is implemented. They both exploit theptrace mechanism provided by a UN=-style OS (including Linux) for the surveillance of other processes. The purpose of [ 151 is intrusion detection and confinement, also similar to that of the UML.
The honeypot is "a computer system that is specifically designed to capture all activity ... of a criminal who has Recently, virtual OS (including UML) has also been applied to the deployment of honeypot [3] , in order to achieve better attack confinement and log data capture. However, due to its different purpose from SODA, UML-based honeypot does nof support resource isolation and virtual firewalling between honeypots. As to logging, LJML-based honeypot supports untamperable logging of attacker's keystrokes.
However, it is not capable of intrusion detection and ASspecific logging. Another project that addresses untamperable logging is ReVirt [ 141. ReVirt is based on the UMLinux [I21 guest OS. I n ReVirt, the logging module is completely outside the guest OS. As a result, the log data of ReVirt may he less detailed than those captured by SODA'S Kernort.
A paradigm similar to the ASHP is the execution of mobile code on a foreign host platform. It also involves a two-way security relationship between the mobile code and the host: we need protection of the latter against the former [22] and vice versa [IS]. However, the ASHP paradigm is different in that the host-tenant relationship in an ASHP usually lasts longer, and that the inter-tenant relationship 
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the protection of Application Service Hosting Platforms (ASHP) poses new research challenges. Due to ASHP's inherent requirement of openness, sharing, and mutual isolation, novel OS architecture and mechanisms are needed to provide protection and isolation between the host (ASHP infrastructure) and the tenants (AS), as well as between different tenants. We argue that the traditional single-level ASHP architecture is not adequate for such protection, and that the two-level architecture based on virtual OS technology appears to he a promising candidate. Based on SODA, our two-level ASHP architecture, we have implemented a number of effective and efficient protection mechanisms, including resource isolation, virtual switching and firewalling, and Kernort for intrusion detection and logging. These mechanisms will serve as the basis for more complicated security mechanisms and policies for ASHP protection.
